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A Rock, a Hard Place, and a Reasonable Suspicion:
How the United States Supreme Court Stripped School
Officials of the Authority to Keep Students Safe
The schoolroom is the first opportunity most citizens have
to experience the power of government. Through it passes
every citizen and public official, from schoolteachers to
policemen and prison guards. The values they learn there,
they take with them in life. One of our most cherished
ideals is the one contained in the Fourth Amendment: that
the government may not intrude on the personal privacy of
its citizens without a warrant or compelling circumstance.
I. INTRODUCTION
On any given weekday, nearly 50 million students file through
schoolhouse doors,2 and each time nearly four million teachers are
there to greet them on the other side.3 For seven hours a day, 180
days a year, teachers are entrusted with these children.4 They
educate them and protect them from harm, eat with them and
watch them play during recess. They see them develop as years
pass. It is no wonder that a child's teacher has been described as
his "third parent."5
From time to time, however, we are reminded that teachers do
not enjoy the extensive powers of a parent. One such reminder
came this past year in Safford Unified School District No. 1 v.
Redding,6 in which the United States Supreme Court held that the
strip search of a 13-year-old middle school student was
unconstitutional. For many people, learning that schools could
strip search students came as a shock.8 Such searches, however, are
not wholly foreign to the schoolyard. Over the past 30 years, quite
Copyright 2010, by THOMAS R. HOOKS.
1. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 385-86 (1985) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
2. Fast Facts, NAT'L CENTER FOR EDUC. STAT., http://nces.ed.gov/
fastfacts/display.asp?id=372 (last visited Feb. 5, 2010).
3. Id.
4. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 17:154.1 (Supp. 2010).
5. CAROL VANDERHEYDEN, A TOUCH OF CLASS 2 (2003) (attributing
"Teacher: The child's third parent" to Hyman Maxwell Berston).
6. 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009).
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., David Andreatta, Strip Search Shock-School's Bizarre
Policy, N.Y. POST, Feb. 1, 2005, at 27; Joe Robertson, Lawsuit Filed over
Alleged Strip Search of Third-Graders in Kansas City, KANSAS CIrY STAR,
Mar. 25, 2002, at B l.
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a few courts have debated whether the strip search of a student was
reasonable, and the results have varied.9
Why schools would resort to such a measure is not a mystery:
Teachers are receiving mixed signals. On the one hand, parents and
government officials put immense pressure on schools to play a
central role in the fight against student drug use and violence.' 0 On
the other hand, they express shock at the mere mention of student
strip searches and condemn schools for even considering such
tactics." These mixed signals will result in the paralysis of school
officials. Obligated to protect students from harm, but afraid of
impending liability, these officials are in desperate need of
guidance. Currently, however, Louisiana law does not address the
strip search of a student.12
This Comment proposes an amendment to the Louisiana law
governing the search of a student's person.13 Part II of this
Comment addresses the prevalence of drug use, violence, and theft
in schools and the pressures placed on school officials to combat
these problems. It then provides examples of student strip searches
and analyzes the harmful psychological effects associated with
such measures. An analysis of the Supreme Court's historic
decision regarding students' rights, New Jersey v. TL.O.,14
follows. Part III examines the Court's most recent decision-
Redding.'5 Part IV reveals the dangers of Louisiana's silence on
this issue before critiquing the legal framework that underlies the
student strip search. Part V proposes that a warrant requirement
will benefit both students and school officials, protecting the
former from frivolous strip searches while shielding the latter from
liability. Finally, Part VI urges the Louisiana Legislature to quickly
adopt appropriate measures.
II. TEACHERS, DON'T LEAVE THEM KIDS ALONE' 6
The strip search of a student is not an issue that can be dealt
with in a vacuum. Before delving into a constitutional analysis, it
is first necessary to examine the confluence of factors leading to
such a search-the value of an education, the obstacles in the way
9. See discussion infra Part II.E and accompanying notes 117-19.
10. See discussion infra Part II.A and accompanying note 28.
11. See supra note 8.
12. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 17:416.3 (2001).
13. Id.
14. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
15. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009).
16. See PINK FLOYD, Another Brick in the Wall, Part II, on THE WALL
(Capitol Records 2000).
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of its attainment, and the pressures placed upon school officials to
overcome these obstacles. With these factors in mind, examples of
student strip searches and research regarding their harmful
psychological effects provide an understanding of the context
within which these searches occur.
A. America's Most Important Function1
Educating America's youth is a national imperative.'s To carry
out this pervasively important task, public school officials must be
empowered to maintain order and discipline in their schools.' 9
Justice Powell of the United States Supreme Court recognized this
need, writing that "[t]he primary duty of school officials and
teachers . . . is the education and training of young people."2 o He
continued: "A State has a compelling interest in assuring that the
schools meet this responsibility. Without first establishing
discipline and maintaining order, teachers cannot begin to educate
their students." 21 In recent years, however, a school official's
ability to maintain discipline and order has been significantly
hampered by almost insurmountable obstacles-drug use,
violence, and theft.
The prevalence of these obstacles is well documented and
poses a significant threat to the educational experiences of students
throughout the nation.22 Because drug use, violence, and theft
17. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) ("Today,
education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments.").
18. Education, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/
education/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2010).
19. ROBERT WHEELER LANE, BEYOND THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE 7 (1995).
20. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 350 (1985) (Powell, J.,
concurring). Louisiana law also recognizes this "compelling interest," declaring
that "[e]very teacher is authorized to hold every pupil to a strict accountability
for any disorderly conduct in school or on the playground of the school." LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:223(A) (2001).
21. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 350 (Powell, J., concurring).
22. See, e.g., NAT'L CTR. FOR ADDICTION & SUBSTANCE ABUSE AT
COLUMBIA UNIV., NATIONAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN ATTITUDES ON SUBSTANCE
ABUSE XII: TEENS AND PARENTS (2007), available at http://www.casacolumbia.
org/download.aspx?path=/UploadedFiles/vilf5lvw.pdf. In 2007, 80% of high
school students and 44% of middle school students personally witnessed drug
dealing, use, or possession. Id. at 1. Not surprisingly, students in these drug-
infested schools were more likely to use drugs themselves. Id. at 1-2; see also,
e.g., NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, INDICATORS OF SCHOOL CRIME AND
SAFETY: 2008 (2008), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2009/2009022
REV.pdf. In the 2005-2006 school year, violent crimes occurred in 78% of
public schools. Id. at 20. In 2007, 6% of students in grades 9 through 12
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contribute to student misbehavior,23 they are responsible for
siphoning resources from where schools need them most-
providing students with a proper education.24 The presence of these
problems, besides making it more difficult to maintain discipline
and provide an education, also has a detrimental effect on a school
official's ability to fulfill his or her legal duty-keeping students
safe from harm.
Louisiana law imposes on school officials a duty of supervision
over their students. s Such supervision must be reasonable,
competent, and "appropriate to the age of the children and the
attendant circumstances." 26 If a student suffers physical injury, the
law may hold the school board liable if the risk of the student's
injury was foreseeable and the exercise of reasonable supervision
could have prevented it.2 7 In other words, Louisiana's school
officials are obligated not only to keep a watchful eye on their
students but also to intervene should they see harm on the horizon.
Today, however, the law is not the only force pressuring school
officials to intervene.
Because drug use, violence, and theft pose significant threats to
student safety and the maintenance of a proper educational
environment, school officials find themselves pressured to act by
both the public and the government. 28 In the introduction to a
reported that they brought a weapon onto campus during the previous month. Id.
at vii. One year earlier, students ages 12 to 18 were more likely to be victims of
theft while at school than anywhere else. Id. at v.
23. NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, supra note 22, at vi ("[I]n 2003-04,
35 percent of teachers agreed or strongly agreed that student misbehavior
interfered with their teaching, and 31 percent reported that student tardiness and
class cutting interfered with their teaching .... ).
24. Id. at 62 (commenting upon the practices and procedures adopted by
schools to ensure the safety of their students); see also NAT'L CTR. FOR
ADDICTION & SUBSTANCE ABUSE AT COLUMBIA UNIV., supra note 22, at iii
(commenting that ridding schools of drugs is necessary to "achieve the
improvements in academic achievements (and test scores) considered essential
to maintain our global competitiveness").
25. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2320 (2010) ("Teachers ... are answerable for the
damage caused by their scholars . . . while under their superintendence.");
accord Wallmuth v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd., 813 So. 2d 341, 346 (La. 2002).
26. Wallmuth, 813 So. 2d at 346.
27. Id.; see also LA. CIV. CODE art. 2320 ("[R]esponsibility only attaches,
when the . . . teachers . . . might have prevented the act which caused the
damage, and have not done it.").
28. See, e.g., LANE, supra note 19, at 6 ("Public concern about school crime
and classroom order increases the pressure on school officials to control
students."); Joan McDermott, Crime in the School and in the Community:
Offenders, Victims, and Fearful Youths, 29 CRIME & DELINQ. 270, 278 (1983)
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handbook published by the United States Department of
Education, the Secretary of Education wrote the following about
the role that schools should play in combating drug use:
Schools are uniquely situated to be part of the solution to
student drug use. Children spend much of their time in
school. Furthermore, schools . . . are major influences in
transmitting ideals and standards of right and wrong. Thus,
although the problems of drug use extend far beyond the
schools, it is critical that our offensive on drugs centers in
the schools.29
Although sounding the call for schools to serve as centers for
the offensive against drug use and violence makes for good
rhetoric, it pressures school boards and officials into adopting
policies and practices that many consider overzealous and
unwise.30 Of these policies and practices, however, only one has
ever been described as "demeaning, dehumanizing, undignified,
humiliating, terrifying, unpleasant, embarrassing, [and] repulsive"
-the strip search.
B. Strip Searches
To different people, the term "strip search" may have different
meanings. Therefore, it is necessary to define this term and provide
examples of student strip searches before proceeding to analyze the
harmful psychological effects that such searches have on children.
(noting the tendency of the public to place blame for crime in schools on school
officials).
29. WILLIAM J. BENNETT, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., WHAT WORKS: SCHOOLS
WITHOUT DRUGS, at vii (1986), quoted in LANE, supra note 19, at 7.
30. See, e.g., J. Bates McIntyre, Empowering Schools to Search: The Effect
of Growing Drug and Violence Concerns on American Schools, 2000 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1025, 1052 (criticizing state lawmakers' reliance on "[t]he doctrines of
implied consent, plain view, and the automobile exception" to craft statutes
empowering school officials to search students' persons or things); Dennis
Cauchon, Schools Struggling to Balance "Zero Tolerance, " Common Sense,
U.S.A. TODAY, Apr. 13, 1999, at lA (reporting on criticism of zero-tolerance
policies as "inflexible, harsh and lacking in common sense"); Ralph C. Martin,
II, Zero Tolerance Policy, AM. B. ASS'N (Feb. 2001), http://www.abanet.org/
crimjustjuvjus/zerotolreport.html (referring to zero-tolerance policies as "one-
size-fits-all" solutions that redefine students as criminals).
31. Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1272 (7th Cir. 1983)
(quoting Tinetti v. Wittke, 479 F. Supp. 486, 491 (E.D. Wis. 1979), affd, 620
F.2d 160 (7th Cir. 1980)).
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1. What Are They and When Do They Occur?
One group of scholars defines a strip search as "the visual
inspection of an individual's body, including those portions usually
hidden by undergarments." 32 Although student strip searches may
occur for a variety of reasons, almost all begin with the objective
of discovering drugs or stolen money.33 The following examples
provide but a brief glimpse of situations in which these searches
may occur.
In Atlantic, Iowa, a school official strip searched four high
school girls after another student reported that $100 was missing
from the girls' locker room after gym class.34 Performing each
search individually, the school official made the first girl remove
her pants and pull her shirt and bra out.3 5 For the remaining
searches, the official required each of the girls to remove her
underwear, one to take off all of her clothing, and another to strip
down twice after she refused to remove her bra during the first
search.36 The missing money was never found.37
After $26 disappeared from a teacher's desk in Clayton
County, Georgia, school officials strip searched 13 fifth-grade
students. 38 Dividing the students by sex, the officials escorted them
into their respective restrooms four to five at a time.39 A male
police officer searched the boys, requiring some to lower their
pants and underwear, while having others submit to a visual
inspection of their private areas.4 0 A female teacher searched the
girls. She required them to "lower their pants and lift their dresses
or shirts'Al and had many lift their bras, thus exposing their
breasts.42 Again, the missing money was never found.4
32. Steven F. Shatz, Molly Donovan & Jeanne Hong, The Strip Search of
Children and the Fourth Amendment, 26 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 1 (1991).
33. See, e.g., Lewis ex rel. Cornfield v. Consol. High Sch. Dist. No. 230,
991 F.2d 1316 (7th Cir. 1993) (discussing a strip search for marijuana); Konop
v. Nw. Sch. Dist., 26 F. Supp. 2d 1189 (D.S.D. 1998) (discussing a strip search
for $200).
34. Jennifer Jacobs, Atlantic Search Excluded "Good Girl," Lawyer Says,
DES MOINES REG., Sept. 19, 2009, at 1.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Thomas ex rel. Thomas v. Roberts, 323 F.3d 950, 951-52 (11th Cir.
2003).
39. Id. at 952.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Thomas v. Clayton Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 94 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1294-95
(N.D. Ga. 1999), aff'd, 261 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2001), vacated, 536 U.S. 953
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Acting on a student tip regarding drug possession," school
officials in Plainville, Connecticut summoned a high school girl's
mother to conduct the strip search of her child.45 A school official
stood in the room as the mother searched her daughter, requiring
her to lift her shirt, pull down her bra, and drop her skirt down to
46her ankles. When the mother asked the school official if they
could stop the search, the school official replied that she could
not.4 The mother then made the girl pull her underwear away from
her body.48 The drugs were never found.49
As the above examples illustrate, the strip search of a student
may occur under a variety of circumstances-some arguably
meriting such a search, others not. Regardless, school officials are
under immense pressure as they struggle to maintain order in the
classroom, safety on the schoolyard, and common sense when
dealing with students. 0 This pressure may sometimes result in a
student being strip searched. But these searches are not without
accompanying evils. For school officials, a frivolous search may
result in potential civil liability5 1 and a sullied reputation.52 For
students, the result may be long-lasting psychological harm.
(2002). When asked about her actions, the teacher responded that the money was
to fund a class field trip, and most of these students lived in poverty; the theft,
she felt, was a serious problem for the children. Bill Rankin, No Liability in
School's Strip Search, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Oct. 5, 1999, at lA. The officer,
however, called the search "no big deal." Bill Montgomery, Firing Over Strip
Search of Fifth-Graders Upheld; Officer Called Hunt for $26 "No Big Deal,"
ATLANTA J. & CONST., June 5, 1997, at 2D.
44. Phaneuf v. Fraikin, 448 F.3d 591, 593 (2d Cir. 2006). A student
informed school officials that the girl possessed marijuana and was hiding it
"down her pants." Id.
45. Id. at 594.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. The girl later stated that throughout the search, she was "extremely
upset and anxious ... to the point of being hysterical." Id.
50. See discussion supra Part II.A.
51. In a number of cases, courts have found that school officials conducting
unreasonable strip searches of students were not entitled to qualified immunity
and were therefore exposed to potential personal liability. See, e.g., Foster v.
Raspberry, 652 F. Supp. 2d 1342 (M.D. Ga. 2009) (strip search of a high school
girl for a missing iPod); Fewless ex rel. Fewless v. Bd. of Educ. of Wayland
Union Sch., 208 F. Supp. 2d 806 (W.D. Mich. 2002) (strip search of fourteen-
year-old boy for marijuana); Bell v. Marseilles Elementary Sch., 160 F. Supp.
2d 883 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (strip search of 30 students for missing money); Konop
ex rel. Konop v. Nw. Sch. Dist., 26 F. Supp. 2d 1189 (D.S.D. 1998) (strip search
of two seventh-grade students for $200); Hines ex rel. Oliver v. McClung, 919
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2. A Strip Search is a Traumatic Event for a Child
The strip search of a child is a traumatic event.53 Members of
the Supreme Court characterized such a search as "shocking"5 4 and
"degrading,"55 one fairly stating that "[i]t does not require a
constitutional scholar to conclude that a nude search of a ... child
is an invasion of constitutional rights of some magnitude."56 These
statements, however, are mere generalizations; they do not shed
any light on the true harms inflicted upon a child subjected to a
strip search. Before school officials should ever consider strip
searching a student, they should contemplate these harms.57
Individuals subjected to strip searches have reported feelin
severely embarrassed and humiliated.58 Others felt powerless.
For females, the effects of strip searches can be similar to those
experienced by rape victims-"recurrent recollections of the event,
inability to concentrate, anxiety, depression, sleep disturbances,
and development of phobic reactions," all of which may persist for
years.60 Although this alone should give school officials pause
before conducting strip searches, the effects that such searches
have on children are even more severe.
F. Supp. 1206 (N.D. Ind. 1995) (strip search of five seventh-grade students for
$4.50).
52. See, e.g., Editorial, Livingston High Reassignments Teach Lessons in
Accountability, MODESTO BEE, Feb. 14, 2005, at B6 (reporting on the demotion
of a principal and assistant principal following a strip search of four female
students); Christian Nolan, Schools Learn Lessons from Strip Search Case,
CONN. L. TIUB., Sept. 14, 2009, at 6 (reporting on the firing of a principal and
teacher following a search of four students for $70).
53. See, e.g., Scott A. Gartner, Strip Searches of Students: What Johnny
Really Learned at School and How Local School Boards Can Help Solve the
Problem, 70 S. CAL. L. REv. 921, 928-29 (1997); Dana Ingrassia, Note, Thomas
ex rel. Thomas v. Roberts: Another Photo Finish Where School Officials Win
the Race for Qualfied Immunity, 26 WHITTIER L. REv. 621, 649-50 (2004).
54. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 382 n.25 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
55. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2642
(2009).
56. Id. at 2644 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(alteration in original) (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 382 n.25).
57. Gartner, supra note 53, at 930.
58. Id. at 928-29; see also, e.g., Marian Gail Brown, Strip Search Decision
Could Affect Ansonia Case, CONN. POST, June 30, 2009, available at 2009
WLNR 12492132.
59. Gartner, supra note 53, at 929.
60. Id.; accord M. Margaret McKeown, Strip Searches Are Alive and Well
in America, 12 HUm. RTS. 37, 42 (1985); Shatz, Donovan & Hong, supra note
32, at 12.
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Children approaching adolescence have a heightened interest in
privacy; for them, privacy serves as an "important .. . marker of
independence and self-differentiation."61 As a result, "[t]hreats to
the privacy of school aged children may be reasonably
hypothesized to . . . function as threats to self-esteem." 6 2 Some
children even interpret a strip search as a form of sexual abuse.63
These harmful effects are particularly disturbing in light of the
pivotal role adolescence plays in a student's personal development.
As one commentator noted:
[A]dolescence is a formative stage in the sense that events
and experiences that take place during this period place
individuals on particular pathways into adulthood that may
set the course of their future lives. . .. [M]ost of the serious
psychological problems that afflict adults, such as depression
or substance abuse, appear first in adolescence. . .. [W]hat
happens during adolescence undoubtedly shapes individuals'
views of the world, their mental health, and their likelihood
of success as adults.64
Because the day-to-day events of adolescence have far-reaching
effects on the lives of students, a school official's decision to strip
search should be confined to those instances in which the school's
interest in conducting the search outweighs the detrimental
psychological harm to be inflicted upon the child.65 This balancing
61. Shatz, Donovan & Hong, supra note 32, at 11 (quoting Gary B. Melton,
Minors and Privacy: Are Legal and Psychological Concepts Compatible?, 62
NEB. L. REV. 455, 488 (1983)).
62. Id.
63. Shatz, Donovan & Hong, supra note 32, at 11-13; accord David C.
Blickenstaff, Strip Searches of Public School Students: Can New Jersey v.
T.L.O. Solve the Problem?, 99 DICK. L. REV. 1, 45 (1994). The two main
sources of trauma in cases of sexual abuse are "'the use of force or coercion by
the abuser' and 'a substantial age difference between the abuser and the
victim'-two factors almost always present in school strip search situations." Id.
(quoting Shatz, Donovan & Hong, supra note 32, at 13). Also, although the strip
search of a student may be only a single incident, the "duration and repetition of
child sexual abuse are unrelated to its traumatic effect." Id. (quoting Shatz,
Donovan & Hong, supra note 32, at 13) (internal quotation marks omitted).
64. ELIZABETH S. ScoTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE
JUSTICE 32 (2008).
65. See Gartner, supra note 53, at 930-31. In Louisiana, a number of school
boards have already performed this balancing test and found that the strip search
of a student is never an appropriate measure in a school setting. See, e.g., ST.
TAMMANY PARISH PUB. SCH. SYS., DISTRICT HANDBOOK FOR STUDENTS AND
PARENTS 2010-2011, at 15 (2010), available at http://www.stpsb.org/files/
handbookstudentsparents.pdf; Searches of Student's Person, ACADIA PARISH
SCH. BOARD, http://www.acadia.kl2.1a.us/policy/POLICY/JCABA.htm (last
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act, however, is not the only constraint placed upon the school
official's decision. An analysis of the legal issues implicated by
strip searching a student reveals that constitutional constraints exist
as well.
C. The United States Constitution Places Strict Constraints on the
Strip Search of a Student
For many years, the applicability of the Bill of Rights to the
daily affairs of public schools was unclear.6 6 Historically, the
relationship between school officials and school children was
governed by the doctrine of in loco parentis.67 This doctrine stood
for the proposition that parents, by sending their children to school,
delegated to school officials a portion of their parental authority-
primarily "that of restraint and correction, as may be necessary to
answer the purposes for which [the school official] is employed." 68
Under the doctrine of in loco parentis, courts were reluctant to
interfere in the "routine business of school administration" 69 and
deemed this hands-off approach necessary for school officials to
maintain discipline and command respect from their students.70
Some courts went so far as to say that school officials acted as
parents and therefore were not subject to the limitations placed
upon state actors under the Constitution. 71 Throughout the
twentieth century, however, in loco parentis began to lose favor
visited Aug. 13, 2010); Searches of Student's Person, E. BATON ROUGE PARISH
SCH. BOARD, http://www.ebrschools.org/eduWEBl/1000437/docs/policy
manualjapplO1608.pdf (last visited Aug. 14, 2010); Searches of Student's
Person, ORLEANS PARISH ScH. BOARD, http://www.nops.kl2.1a.us/uploads/File/
board/Policy/ 20Manual/Merged%20Polices%20REV%20-%20PDF.pdf (last
visited Aug. 14, 2010); Student Searches, LIVINGSTON PARISH SCH. BOARD,
http://policy.lpsb.org/JCAB.htm (last visited Aug. 14, 2010); Student Searches,
WEBSTER PARISH SCH. BOARD., http://www.websterpsb.org/WebsterCAPS/
Policy/JCAB.htm (last visited Aug. 14, 2010).
66. See generally Richard Jenkins, An Historical Approach to Search and
Seizure in Public Education, 30 W. ST. U. L. REV. 105 (2003).
67. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2646
(2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
68. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
441 (Dawsons of Pall Mall 1966) (1765), quoted in Jenkins, supra note 66, at
114.
69. Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2646 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (quoting Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 414 (2007)
(Thomas, J., concurring)).
70. Jenkins, supra note 66, at 115 (citing State v. Pendergrass, 19 N.C. (2
Dev. & Bat.) 365, 368 (1837)).
71. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336 (1985).
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with the United States Supreme Court,72 and in the mid-1980s, this
doctrine's questionable relationship with the Fourth Amendment
was challenged. In New Jersey v. T.L.O., one girl and a pack of
cigarettes would forever change a student's right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures.74
D. New Jersey v. T.L.O.: A Student's Rights Under the Fourth
Amendment
In T.L.O., an assistant principal searched the purse of a high
school girl, T.L.O., after a teacher discovered her smoking a
cigarette in the school's lavatory-a violation of school rules.75
The search revealed cigarettes and a package of cigarette rolling
papers.76 Aware that possession of rolling papers may implicate
marijuana use,77 the assistant principal performed a more thoroug
search of the purse and discovered a small amount of marijuana.
After police obtained this evidence, delinquency charges were
brought against T.L.O.79
The United States Supreme Court addressed two issues in this
case, the first of which was whether the Fourth Amendment, as
applied through the Fourteenth, imposes constraints on a public
school official conducting a search of a student's person.8 0
Criticizing the doctrine of in loco parentis, the Court said that it
was "in tension with contemporary reality"8' and "not entirely
'consonant with compulsory education laws."' 82 Because school
officials "act in furtherance of publicly mandated educational and
disciplinary policies,"8 3 they act "not merely as surrogates for the
72. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
506 (1969) ("It can hardly be argued that . . . students . . . shed their
constitutional rights ... at the schoolhouse gate."); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) ("The Fourteenth Amendment, as now
applied to the States, protects the citizen against the State itself and all of its
creatures-Boards of Education not excepted.").
73. TL.O., 469 U.S. 325.
74. Id. at 328.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 328-29.
80. Id. at 333. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the
means through which the Fourth Amendment's protections against unreasonable
searches and seizures are enforceable against the states. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
81. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336.
82. Id. (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 662 (1977)).
83. Id
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parents, and [therefore] cannot claim the parents' immunity from
the strictures of the Fourth Amendment." 4 For these reasons, the
Court held that it was "indisputable" that the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments protect a student's right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures.8 5
The second issue before the Court was whether the Fourth
Amendment's formal requirements-a warrant and probable
cause-are binding ugon a school official who conducts a search
of a student's person. 6 In determining the reasonableness of this
search, the Court employed a balancing test.87 On the one hand, the
Court stated, are the student's "legitimate expectations of privacy
and personal security."88 It found that "[a] search of a child's
person or .. . bag carried on her person ... is undoubtedly a severe
violation of subjective expectations of privacy." 89 On the other
hand, the Court noted, is a school official's "substantial interest ...
in maintaining discipline in the classroom and on school
grounds," 90 especially in light of the fact that "drug use and violent
crime in the schools have become major social problems." 91
Because of these compelling yet competing interests, the Court
declared that "a certain degree of flexibility in school disciplinary
procedures" is necessary for school officials to maintain security
and order. 92 Dismissing the Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirement, the Court stated that "requiring a teacher to obtain a
warrant . . . would unduly interfere with the maintenance of the
swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in the
schools."93 As for the level of suspicion necessary to search, the
Court said that "a careful balancing of governmental and private
interests" revealed that the public would best be served "by a
Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness that stops short of
probable cause." 94
Having cast aside the most basic protections afforded by the
Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court crafted a new test by
which to judge the constitutionality of a search of a student's
84. Id. at 336-37.
85. Id. at 334 (citing W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637
(1943)).
86. Id. at 332.
87. Id. at 337.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 337-38.
90. Id. at 339.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 340.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 341.
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person.95 This test rested upon a twofold inquiry.96 First, the search
must be justified at its inception, meaning that there must be
"reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up
evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law
or the rules of the school."97 Second, the search must be
permissible in scope, meaning that "the measures adopted are
reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not
excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and
the nature of the infraction."98 These standards, the Court found,
would "spare teachers and school administrators the necessity of
schooling themselves in the niceties of probable cause," while also
ensuring "that the interests of students will be invaded no more
than is necessary to achieve . .. order in the schools."99
Before applying this new test, the Court explained that this
case involved two separate searches: the first for the discovery of
cigarettes and the second for the discovery of marijuana.'00 With
respect to the first search, because T.L.O. was accused of smoking
cigarettes in the lavatory-a violation of a school rule-the Court
held that the assistant principal acted reasonably in seeking
evidence of this infraction,' 01 even though the mere possession of
cigarettes did not violate any such rule.102 With respect to the
second search, the Court held that once the assistant principal
discovered the package of cigarette rolling papers, he possessed a
reasonable suspicion to believe that marijuana would also be found
in T.L.O.'s purse. 103 This suspicion justified the more intrusive
search, leading to the discovery of the marijuana.' 04 Thus, the
Supreme Court found that both of the assistant principal's searches
were reasonable. 0 5
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 342.
98. Id
99. Id. at 343.
100. Id. at 343-44.
101. Id at 345.
102. The Court explained that "evidence, to be relevant to an inquiry, need
not conclusively prove the ultimate fact in issue, but only have 'any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."'
Id. at 345 (quoting FED. R. EvID. 401).
103. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 347.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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E. Challenging a Search of a Student's Person: 42 U.S. C. § 1983
and Qualified Immunity
T.L.O. makes it clear that when a public school official
searches a student's person, Fourth Amendment protections are at
issue. As a result, parents and students, believing that a school
official has violated the student's right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures, may seek damages under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.106 This statute provides a private citizen with a
remedy when his or her federally protected rights have been
violated by a public official. 0 7 Although the benefits of the § 1983
action-providing a means of deterring state actors from willfully
ignoring the prohibitions present in the Constitution-are readily
apparent,s0 8 the history of the statute reveals effects that are less
than desirable.
Since the creation of the § 1983 cause of action, litigation over
alleged constitutional violations became more and more frequent.' 09
Initially, this created a concern that imposing liability on a public
official may be unfair because of "the often unclear nature of
constitutional law."' 10 Also, it was thought that the mere potential
for liability could instill fear in public officials and cause them to
abstain from engaging in conduct beneficial to the public good."'
For these reasons, the Supreme Court developed an obstacle to a
successful § 1983 action-the doctrine of qualified immunity.112
The doctrine of qualified immunity shields public officials,
such as teachers and school administrators, from civil liability,
therefore empowering them to perform their duties and exercise
106. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). This statute provides, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress ....
Id.
107. Patsy Thimmig, Not Your Average School Day-Reading, Writing and
Strip Searching: The Eleventh Circuit's Decision in Jenkins v. Talladega City
Board of Education, 42 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1389, 1392 (1998).
108. Alan K. Chen, The Ultimate Standard: Qualified Immunity in the Age of
Constitutional Balancing Tests, 81 IOWA L. REv. 261, 263 (1995).
109. See Blickenstaff, supra note 63, at 19; Thimmig, supra note 107, at
1393.
110. Chen, supra note 108, at 264; accord Thimmig, supra note 107, at 1393.
111. Chen, supra note 108, at 264; accord Thimmig, supra note 107, at 1393.
112. See Chen, supra note 108, at 264; accord Blickenstaff, supra note 63, at
19-20; Thimmig, supra note 107, at 1393.
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their discretion without fear of liability and litigation. 113 A public
official is entitled to qualified immunity "if the law at [the time of
the alleged violation is] not clearly established, [meaning that] an
official could not reasonably be expected to anticipate subsequent
legal developments, nor could he fairly be said to 'know' that the
law forbade conduct not previously identified as unlawful."ll 4 A
right is clearly established when "[t]he contours of the right [are]
sufficiently clear [such] that a reasonable official would understand
that what he is doing violates that right."' 15 This does not mean
that "the very action in question has previously been held
unlawful," but that "in the light of pre-existing law the
unlawfulness must be apparent." 1 6
During much of the last three decades, American courts have
debated whether the student strip search is a reasonable measure
under the Constitution.' 17 Many found, from the facts of the cases
before them, that such a search was unreasonable and therefore
violative of the child's Fourth Amendment rights." 8 However,
even these courts disagreed as to whether T.L.O. "clearly
established" the law in this area, and thus whether school officials
in each case were entitled to qualified immunity.' 19 In June of
113. Recent Case, Redding v. Safford Unified School District No. 1, 531
F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc), 122 HARV. L. REv. 811, 811 (2008).
114. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see also Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987) (stating that a public official is entitled to
qualified immunity "if a reasonable [official] could have believed [his or her
conduct] to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information [the
official actually] possessed").
115. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640.
116. Id.
117. See, e.g., Beard v. Whitmore Lake Sch. Dist., 402 F.3d 598 (6th Cir.
2005) (strip search of an entire class for missing prom money); Lewis ex rel.
Cornfield v. Consol. High Sch. Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316 (7th Cir. 1993)
(strip search when student is suspected of "crotching" drugs); Williams ex rel.
Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881 (6th Cir. 1991) (strip search for "small vial
containing suspected narcotics"); Fewless ex rel. Fewless v. Bd. of Educ. of
Wayland Union Sch., 208 F. Supp. 2d 806 (W.D. Mich. 2002) (strip search
when student is suspected of hiding marijuana in his buttocks).
118. See, e.g., Phaneuf v. Fraikin, 448 F.3d 591 (2d Cir. 2006) (strip search
based solely on an uncorroborated tip is unreasonable); Beard, 402 F.3d 598
(strip search conducted without individualized suspicion is unreasonable).
119. See, e.g., Beard, 402 F.3d 598 (finding that T.L.O. did not clearly
establish the law, therefore school official was entitled to qualified immunity);
accord Thomas ex rel. Thomas v. Roberts, 323 F.3d 950 (11th Cir. 2003). But
see, e.g., Fewless, 208 F. Supp. 2d 806 (relying on T.L.O. and Sixth Circuit
jurisprudence to find a strip search unreasonable and deny school officials
qualified immunity); Hines ex rel. Oliver v. McClung, 919 F. Supp. 1206 (N.D.
Ind. 1995) (relying on T.L.O. and Seventh Circuit jurisprudence to find a strip
search unreasonable and deny school officials qualified immunity).
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2009, the United States Supreme Court finally addressed these
issues in Redding.'20
III. SAFFORD UNIFIED SCHOOL DisTRICT V. REDDING: THE SUPREME
COURT SPEAKS
On October 8, 2003, Savana Redding, a 13-year-old honor
student, was sitting in her math class when the assistant principal
of her school entered and requested that she accompany him to his
office.121 Once in the office, the assistant principal showed Savana
a daily planner and its contents-most importantly, four
prescription-strength ibuprofen 400 mg pills and one over-the-
counter blue naproxen 200 mg pill-all banned by school rules. 122
Though Savana admitted owning the planner, she denied any
knowledge of the pills and informed the assistant principal that,
days before, she lent the planner to one of her friends-Marissa
Glines.123
The assistant principal then told Savana that he had been
notified that she was planning to distribute these pills to other
students.124 Savana denied the allegation, but nevertheless allowed
the assistant principal to search her belongings.' 25 With the aid of
an administrative assistant, the assistant principal searched
Savana's backpack, finding nothing.' 26 Following this fruitless
search, the assistant principal instructed the administrative assistant
to take Savana to the nurse's office and search her clothes for the
pills.127 It was there that Savana Redding was strip searched.128
The school officials first required Savana to take off her socks,
shoes, and jacket for inspection,12 9 followed by her T-shirt and
stretch pants.130 After examining Savana's outer clothing, no pills
were found.131 Finally, the school officials required Savana to pull
out her bra and shake it-exposing her breasts-and pull out her
underwear at the crotch-exposing her pelvic area.' 32 After forcing
120. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. I v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009).
121. Id. at 2638.
122. Id
123. Id
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Redding v. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 531 F.3d 1071, 1075 (9th
Cir. 2008) (en banc), rev'd in part, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009).
132. Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2638.
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Savana to undergo "the most humiliating experience of her short
life," 33 the school officials did not find any pills.134
Following the search, Savana's mother filed suit against the
school district, the assistant principal, the administrative assistant,
and the school nurse under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.135 The defendants
moved for summar 3 udgment, arguing that they were entitled to
qualified immunity. The district court granted the motion, and a
panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.137 The Ninth
Circuit sitting en banc, however, found the search to be
unreasonable in light of the Supreme Court's holding in T.L.O.13 8
The Ninth Circuit also found that Savana's right to be free from
unreasonable strip searches was clearly established and therefore
denied the defendants the defense of qualified immunity.19 The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.140
Justice Souter, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Scalia, Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito,141 framed the issue as
"whether a 13-year-old student's Fourth Amendment right was
violated when she was subjected to a search of her bra and
underpants by school officials acting on reasonable suspicion that
she had brought forbidden prescription and over-the-counter drugs
to school."l 4 Ultimately, the Court held that the strip search of
Savana Redding was unreasonable, but because the law was not
clearly established at the time of the violation, the assistant
principal was entitled to qualified immunity.143 However, in doing
so, the Court crafted a new standard by which courts must judge
the reasonableness of student strip searches.144
The Court began its analysis by reiterating much of its opinion
in T.L.O., giving particular attention to its requirement that courts
apply "a standard of reasonable suspicion to determine the legality
of a school administrator's search of a student."1 4 5 In determining
133. Redding, 531 F.3d at 1075 (internal quotation marks omitted).
134. Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2638.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985)).
139. Id. The Ninth Circuit did, however, affirm the lower court's decision
regarding the school nurse and administrative assistant, as they were not acting
as independent decisionmakers. Id.
140. Id. at 2639.
141. Id. at 2637.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 2637-38.
144. Id. at 2637.
145. Id. at 2639. Prior to this statement, the Court noted the "fluid concepts"
it found useful in the past when judging the sufficiency of information-'the
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whether information is sufficient to satisfy this standard, the Court
stated that the required knowledge component for a school search
can "readily be described as a moderate chance of finding
evidence of wrongdoing."l 46
Moving on, the Court expounded upon the deference that
courts should grant to a school's determination of what constitutes
a valid and legitimate school rule.14 7 "[S]tandards of conduct for
schools are for school administrators to determine without second-
guessing by courts lacking the experience to appreciate what may
be needed. Except in patently arbitrary instances, Fourth
Amendment analysis takes the rule as a given . . . ."148 With
respect to the wisdom of rules restricting the presence of drugs on
campus, the Court stated, "Teachers are not pharmacologists
trained to identify pills and powders, and an effective drug ban has
to be enforceable fast."' 4 9 Therefore, an argument that the rule
underlying a strip search did not warrant that type of intrusion
would be without merit.'5 0  The Court then addressed the
reasonableness of the assistant principal's search of Savana's outer
clothing and backpack, beginning its analysis with an examination
of the information upon which the assistant principal's suspicion
was based.'
One week before school officials searched Savana, a student at
the school, Jordan Romero, reported to the assistant principal that
"certain students were bringing drugs and weapons on campus, and
that he had been sick after taking some pills that he got from a
classmate." 52 On the morning of the search, Jordan handed a white
pill to the assistant principal, revealed to him that he received it
from Marissa Glines, and instructed him that students were
planning to take these pills during the lunch break.153 The assistant
degree to which known facts imply prohibited conduct . . . the specificity of the
information received ... and the reliability of its source." Id.
146. Id. (emphasis added). Generally, searches under the Fourth Amendment
require probable cause, which "exists where 'the facts and circumstances within
[an officer's] knowledge and of which [he] had reasonably trustworthy
information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief' that an offense has been or is being committed." Id.
(alterations in original) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-
76 (1949)).
147. Id. at 2639-40.
148. Id. at 2640 n.1.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 2640.
152. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
153. Id.
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principal then brought the pill to the school nurse and learned that
it was an ibuprofen 400 mg-a pill available only by
prescription. 154 This information led the assistant principal to
search the pockets and wallet of Marissa Glines, revealing a single
blue pill and several white ones.155 When the assistant principal
questioned Marissa as to where she received these pills, she
replied, "Savana Redding." 156 The assistant principal then
questioned Marissa about the planner that was in her possession;
she denied any knowledge of its contents.157 After calling the
poison control hotline to identify the blue pill-naproxen 200 mg,
a commonly used anti-inflammatory drug available over the
counter-the assistant principal subjected Marissa to a search
similar to the one Savana was soon to undergo.' 5 8 No additional
pills were found.'5 9
It was after this search of Marissa that the assistant principal
called Savana into his office.160 His conversation with her revealed
that she and Marissa were friends and that she had lent the planner
to Marissa. 161 The assistant principal also received reports from
staff members confirming Savana's characterization of the girls'
relationship.162 The Court stated that this information was
sufficient for the assistant princi al to infer that both girls were
connected to the pills found.160 Furthermore, the Court found
Marissa's statement implicating Savana was "sufficiently plausible
to warrant suspicion that Savana was involved in pill
distribution."' 16
Thus, the Court found that the assistant principal had
sufficiently reliable information to constitute a reasonable
suspicion that Savana Redding was distributing the pills and that
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158.. Id. School officials also subjected Marissa to a search of her bra and
underwear. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 2641.
162. Id. These reports identified Savana and Marissa "as part of an unusually
rowdy group" at a school dance earlier in the year-a dance in which "alcohol
and cigarettes were found in the girls' bathroom." Id. In addition, the assistant
principal knew that the student who had initially reported the pill-taking plot had
been to a pre-dance party at Savana's house and that, at that party, alcohol was
served. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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she was carrying them either on her person or in her backpack.165
Therefore, the search of Savana's outer clothing and backpack was
justified at its inception and was not excessively intrusive,1 66
meeting the two requirements of a reasonable student search under
T.L.O. 1 The further search, however, exceeded reason.
The Court began its analysis of this further search by
distinguishing it from that of Savana's outer clothing and
backpack. The Court stated that "a fair way to speak" of the
incident was as a "strip search."' 68 Responding to the school
officials' claims that they did not actually see any of Savana's
intimate parts during the search, the Court noted that the
reasonableness, or lack thereof, of a strip search does not depend
on "who was looking and how much was seen."l 69 Furthermore,
the Court commented:
The very fact of Savana's pulling her underwear away from
her body in the presence of the two officials ... necessarily
exposed her breasts and pelvic area to some degree, and
both subjective and reasonable societal expectations of
personal privacy support the treatment of such a search as
categorically distinct, requiring distinct elements of
justification on the part of school authorities for going
beyond a search of outer clothing and belongings.170
Crafting these "distinct elements of justification" was the Court's
next task.
The Court began this process by examining the harmful effects
that such intrusive searches have on children. The Court noted that
Savana's account of the search as "embarrassing, frightening, and
humiliating" was consistent with the "experiences of other young
people similarly searched, whose adolescent vulnerability
intensifies the patent intrusiveness of the exposure.""'7 Requiring a
student to expose his or her body in response to an accusation, the
Court found, is "reserved for suspected wrongdoers and [is] fairly
understood as . . . degrading." 7 The Court noted, however, that
"[t]he indignity of the search does not . . . outlaw it, but it does
implicate the rule of reasonableness as stated in T.L.O."l 73 In other
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341-42 (1985).
168. Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2641.
169. Id
170. Id. (emphasis added).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 2642.
173. Id. (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985)).
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words, the search must be permissible in scope, meaning "not
excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and
the nature of the infraction." 74
Elaborating on the scope of this particular search, the Court
found that "the content of the [assistant principal's] suspicion
failed to match the degree of intrusion.", 7 5 This was so because the
assistant principal identified the pills prior to the search and was
aware of "the nature and limited threat of the specific drugs." 76
Furthermore, the Court noted that the assistant principal "had no
reason to suspect that large amounts of the drugs were being
passed around, or that individual students were receiving great
numbers of pills." 77 Thus, given the nature of the contraband at
issue, the strip search was not justified.
Contributing to the failure of the assistant principal's suspicion
was the fact that he "could [not] have suspected that Savana was
hiding common painkillers in her underwear." 78 Though the
assistant principal claimed that students in general have been
known to conceal contraband in their underwear, the Court stated
that the strip search of a student is so extreme an intrusion that it
"requires some justification in suspected facts."' 7 9 Examining the
record, the Court did not find any of these "suspected facts" that
would justify the strip search. First, the non-dangerous nature of
these pills did not raise a suspicion that Savana would stash them
in an intimate place.' 80 Second, there was no general practice
among the school's students of hiding this sort of contraband in
their underwear. 8 1 Third, neither Marissa nor Jordan-the students
providing the information upon which the assistant principal's
suspicion was based-suggested that Savana was hiding the pills
in her underwear.' 82 Fourth, the preceding search of Marissa
yielded no contraband.' 83 Finally, the assistant principal failed to
inquire as to when Marissa received the pills from Savana.184 If he
had done so and discovered that Savana gave the pills to Marissa
174. Id. (quoting TL.O., 469 U.S. at 341).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
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days before, this factor would have weighed against the strip
search. 185
After conducting its analysis, the Court announced the new
standard governing student strip searches: "[T]he T.L.O. concern to
limit a school search to reasonable scope requires the support of
reasonable suspicion of danger or of resort to underwear for hiding
evidence of wrongdoing before a search can reasonably make the
quantum leap from outer clothes and backpacks to exposure of
intimate parts."' 86 In other words, before a school official may strip
search a student, the official must possess either a reasonable
suspicion that the object sought presents a danger to a member of
the student community or a reasonable suspicion that a student is
concealing evidence of wrongdoing in his or her undergarments.1
Finding that the assistant principal did not possess either of the
two abovementioned justifications, the Supreme Court held that
"[t]he strip search of Savana Reddina was unreasonable and a
violation of the Fourth Amendment."' However, the Court found
that T.L. 0. did not clearly establish the law regarding the strip
search of a student and therefore held that the assistant principal,
administrative assistant, and school nurse were all entitled to
qualified immunity.189
IV. THE TWIN PITFALLS OF SILENCE AND AMBIGUITY
Because the United States Supreme Court has ruled on the
constitutionality of the student strip search, some members of the
legal community believe that the law is now "clearly
established.' 90 This means that, in the future, a school official who
conducts a search falling outside of the constraints imposed by
Redding may not be entitled to qualified immunity. Louisiana
school officials are now in a precarious position: Louisiana law
obligates school officials to supervise their children and, should
danger appear imminent, to intercede to prevent injury-perhag
even conducting a strip search should the circumstances require.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 2643.
187. Id. at 2642.
188. Id. at 2644.
189. Id. at 2643-44.
190. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 58; Nolan, supra note 52.
191. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2320 (2010) (imposing upon school officials the
duties to supervise students and to prevent injury if the risk of injury is
foreseeable); Wallmuth v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd., 813 So. 2d 341 (La. 2002);
see also LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 17:416.3 (2001) (authorizing school officials to
search a student's person).
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These same officials may now, however, be wary of conducting
any search that falls within the scope of Redding for fear of
liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. With potential liability looming
on either side of the issue, school officials are in serious need of
direction.
Currently, Louisiana law is silent on the issue of student strip
searches. The statute governing the search of a student's person
provides only general guidelines; 192 it fails to address under what
circumstances a strip search is warranted and, if warranted, how it
should be executed. As the Supreme Court noted in Redding, the
strip search of a student is "categorically distinct,"1 93 and therefore
it requires its own rule. However merely adopting the Court's
"distinct elements of justification"' is not enough. The guidelines
established in Redding are ambiguous and, at times, inadequate.
They fail to address important issues confronted by other courts
dealing with this issuel 9 and require school officials to conduct an
almost impossible risk analysis.96 As a result, school officials are
left exposed to potential liability.' 97
For these reasons, the Louisiana Legislature should amend the
current student-search statutel98 to establish additional safeguards
for both students and school officials. Before crafting this
amendment, however, it is necessary to explore the conceptual
framework underlying the strip search of a student. This requires
(1) an examination of the inferences that may or may not be drawn
from the Supreme Court's opinions in TL. 0. and Redding, and (2)
an analysis of the Court's "distinct elements of justification" and a
school official's ability to apply them in practice.
192. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:416.3(A)(2)(a). The statute provides only that
the search of a student's person "shall be conducted in a manner that is
reasonably related to the purpose of the search and not excessively intrusive in
light of the age or sex of the student and the nature of the suspected offense." Id.
193. Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2641.
194. Id.
195. See discussion infra Parts IV.A.2.b-c, V.B.1.
196. See discussion infra Part IV.B.1.
197. Louisiana Revised Statutes section 17:416.3(B) provides that the school
board employing a school official will be responsible for funding the official's
defense and for indemnification should he or she be liable for damages.
However, the stigma attached to strip searches and the potential for relocation or
job loss still hang over the heads of school officials. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
17:416.3(B); see, e.g., Rosalio Ahumada, School Leader "On Hold" for Now,
MERCED SUN-STAR, Jan. 4, 2005, at Al. Also, the burdens of costly litigation
are especially troublesome in light of the budgetary shortfalls many school
boards now face. See, e.g., Mike Hasten, Board Sees Need for More State
Funding for Schools, SHREVEPORT TIMES, Oct. 15, 2009, available at 2009
WLNR 20387699.
198. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:416.3(A)(2)(a).
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A. Reconciling Redding and T.L.O.
In Redding, the Supreme Court held that a school search
conducted below the outer clothing of a 13-year-old female is
unconstitutional when supported only by a reasonable suspicion
that she vossessed contraband of limited threat somewhere on her
person.1 Absent either of two elements-a reasonable suspicion
of danger or a reasonable suspicion that the student is concealing
evidence of wrongdoing in her undergarments-such a search is
never permissible. oo Thus, in Redding, the Court did not create a
test entirely separate from that established in T.L.O. Instead, it only
required that school officials possess additional justification before
conducting strip searches of students. The following paragraphs
attempt to determine when it is that a search falls within the scope
of Redding and then describe the circumstances under which such
a search will be (1) justified at its inception and (2) permissible in
scope. This analysis reveals, however, that under the ambiguous
standards enunciated by the Supreme Court, it is nearly impossible
to provide any definitive statement regarding the reasonableness of
a student strip search.
1. Justified at Inception: What is the Difference Between a
Backpack and Bare Skin?
After Redding, a court's first task in determining the
reasonableness of a student strip search is to ask whether it was
justified at its inception. 20 1 A search will pass muster under this
test when a school official possesses a reasonable suspicion that it
will reveal evidence that makes the determination of a violation of
a law or school rule more or less probable. 202 Although this
appears to be a rather simple rule, it requires clarification.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Redding, a number of
lower courts held that "the level of suspicion required for a search
to be justified at its inception varies with the intrusiveness of the
199. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009).
200. Id. at 2641.
201. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985).
202. In T.L.O., the Supreme Court held that a search will be justified at its
inception when a school official possesses a reasonable suspicion "that the
search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either
the law or the rules of the school." Id. at 341-42. Louisiana law recognizes that
evidence, to be relevant, must have "any tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence." LA. CODE EvID. art. 401
(2006).
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search." 2 03 In other words, these courts adopted a sliding-scale
approach when determining the reasonableness of a strip search,
looking at the information upon which the school official's
suspicion was based and asking whether sufficient corroboration
from reliable sources existed to justify the search.204 If the search
to be conducted was merely of a student's backpack, it would
require a lower level of suspicion-less corroborative evidence or
less reliable sources or both-in order to be justified at its
205
inception. A strip search, however, would require a higher level
of suspicion before a court would deem it lawful. This approach is
contrary to the Supreme Court's logic in T.L.O. and its statements
in Redding.
In TL. 0., the Court defined a search not by its intrusiveness,
but by the object sought.20 6 The Court found that the school official
conducted the first search when he looked through T.L.O.'s purse
for the cigarettes. 2 07 The fruits of that search-the cigarette
wrapping papers-then justified the inception of the second search
for marijuana.2 08 Searches are distinguished, therefore, not by
differences in their relative intrusiveness, but by whether the
objects sought are from unrelated infractions. 209 Furthermore, in
Redding, the Supreme Court stated that a reasonable suspicion to
search a student's person, regardless of whether it is a strip search
or of outer clothin, exists when there is a "moderate chance" of a
successful search. Had the Court wished to impose a sliding-
scale requirement, it could have taken this opportunity to do so.
If a school official has a reasonable suspicion that a student
possesses evidence of a rule violation on his or her person, the
school official's search is justified at its inception regardless of
whether the search is of the student's backpack, outer clothing, or
undergarments. In other words, courts should treat a strip search no
203. Redding v. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 531 F.3d 1071, 1095 (9th
Cir. 2008) (Hawkins, J., dissenting), rev'd in part, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009)
(criticizing the majority's reliance on Phaneuf v. Fraikin, 448 F.3d 591 (2d Cir.
2006), and Lewis ex rel. Cornfield v. Consol. High Sch. Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d
1316 (7th Cir. 1993)).
204. See, e.g., Phaneuf 448 F.3d at 596-97.
205. See, e.g., Cornfield, 991 F.2d at 1321 ("What may constitute reasonable
suspicion for a search of a locker or even a pocket or pocketbook may fall well
short of reasonableness for a nude search.").
206. TL.O., 469 U.S. at 343-44.
2 0 7. Id.
208. Id. at 347.
209. Redding v. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 531 F.3d 1071, 1096 (9th
Cir. 2008) (Hawkins, J., dissenting), rev'd in part, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009).
210. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. I v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2639
(2009).
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differently than any other search of a student's person or
belongings for the purposes of the justified-at-inception prong of
the T.L.O. test; any such disparate treatment is more appropriate
under the next prong of the test-whether the search was
permissible in scope.
2. Permissible in Scope
A court's second task in determining the reasonableness of a
student strip search requires asking whether the search was
"reasonably related in scope to the circumstances [justifying the
search]"211 or, stated otherwise, whether the search was
permissible in scope. A strip search will satisfy this requirement
"when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the
objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the
age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction." 2 12 This
prong of the T.L. 0. test requires further deconstruction.
a. Measures Reasonably Related to the Objectives of the Search
The first requirement of the permissibility-in-scope prong is
that "the measures adopted [must be] reasonably related to the
objectives of the search." 2 13 This requirement is meant merely to
make a court consider "the search's probability of success,
examining the nature of the evidence sought and any facts that
make it more or less likely such evidence will be found in a
specific location."214 For example, it would be unreasonable for a
school official to search a student's underwear for a crowbar.2 15
Although this is a relatively "straightforward inquiry," 2 16 the
remaining factors under this prong do not make for such simple
analysis.
b. Not Excessively Intrusive in Light of the Age of the Student
The second requirement of this prong of the T.L.O. test
demands that the search not be "excessively intrusive in light of
the age . . . of the student."217 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court
211. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).
212. Id. at 342.
213. Id.
214. Redding, 531 F.3d at 1103 (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
215. Id. at 1104.
216. Id. at 1103.
217. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342; see also Redding, 531 F.3d at 1104 (Hawkins,
J., dissenting).
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failed to elaborate on what distinctions may be drawn based on the
age of a student,218 and the lower courts that have addressed this
issue passed over it with little, if any, analysis. 219 However, as one
commentator noted, "It should be obvious that, in determining
under what circumstances a strip search is permissible, whether the
child is two or seven or seventeen is relevant." 220
When determining whether a strip search is excessively
intrusive, Louisiana law should recognize the distinctions that exist
among students with respect to age. Generally, adolescents are
presumed to be as capable as adults of both engaging in criminal
behavior2 2 1 and understanding "the issues involved in a strip
search, including deciding whether to consent." 222 Elementary
school students, however, are presumed to be "far less likely to
engage independently in criminal activity, including concealing
,,223
contraband in private areas. Because of the latter presumption,
a younger student's ability to understand the impact of a strip
search and to give meaningful consent is questionable. 224 Thus, it
appears that the strip search of an adolescent may be more
reasonable than a similar search of a younger child. But given the
sparse treatment of the age factor, its meaning remains ambiguous
and its future impact unknown.
218. See Shatz, Donovan & Hong, supra note 32, at 14; Lewis ex rel.
Cornfield v. Consol. High Sch. Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316, 1321 (7th Cir.
1993).
219. Of the courts that considered the age of the student in their analysis,
many fail to explain the reasoning behind their decisions. See, e.g., Pendleton v.
Fassett, No. 08-227-C, 2009 WL 2849542, at *8 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 1, 2009);
Konop ex rel. Konop v. Nw. Sch. Dist., 26 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1204 (D.S.D.
1998); Hines ex rel. Oliver v. McClung, 919 F. Supp. 1206, 1218 (N.D. Ind.
1995); Cales v. Howell Pub. Sch., 635 F. Supp. 454, 458 (E.D. Mich. 1985); see
also Thimmig, supra note 107, at 1411. But see Cornfield, 991 F.2d at 1321, for
a lengthy discussion of the relevance of a student's age.
220. Shatz, Donovan & Hong, supra note 32, at 14. At least one court has
agreed with this statement. See Cornfield, 991 F.2d at 1319. In Cornfield, a
sixteen-year-old male high school student was strip searched after school
officials spotted what they believed to be "an unusual bulge in [his] crotch area."
Id.
221. See Cornfield, 991 F.2d at 1321; Shatz, Donovan & Hong, supra note
32, at 16.
222. Cornfield, 991 F.2d at 1321; see Shatz, Donovan & Hong, supra note
32, at 17.
223. Cornfield, 991 F.2d at 1321; see Shatz, Donovan & Hong, supra note
32, at 16-17.
224. See Cornfield, 991 F.2d at 1321; Shatz, Donovan & Hong, supra note
32, at 17.
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c. Not Excessively Intrusive in Light of the Sex of the Student
The third requirement of the permissibility-in-scope prong is
that the search must not be "excessively intrusive in light of the ...
sex of the student." 225 Generally, courts interpret this to mean that
the school official who actually conducts the strip search must be
of the same sex as the student.226 Beyond this, however, there is
little or no consensus. At least one legal scholar has suggested that
courts should interpret this requirement to take into account
attributes other than the student's sex.227 For example, if a school
official was aware of a student's mental disability or history of
physical or sexual abuse, this knowledge may caution against a
228strip search.
Given the language used by the Supreme Court in T.L.O., the
former interpretation seems more reasonable. However, the latter
provides more leeway for courts seeking to distinguish one strip
search from another. Therefore, this factor also remains a source of
potential liability for school officials.
d Not Excessively Intrusive in Light of the Nature of the
Infraction
The fourth and final requirement of the permissibility-in-scope
prong is that the search must not be "excessively intrusive in light
of the . . . nature of the infraction." 2 2 9 Although this requirement
appears to contradict the Supreme Court's refusal to second-guess
the wisdom of school rules, o an explanation is available. When
determining whether the search is justified at its inception, the
nature of the infraction is irrelevant. 31 As Judge Hawkins of the
Ninth Circuit stated, "[No school rule is too trivial to allow for
225. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985); see also Redding v.
Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 531 F.3d 1071, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008) (Hawkins,
J., dissenting), rev'd in part, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009).
226. See, e.g., Cornfield, 991 F.2d at 1320.
227. Redding, 531 F.3d at 1104 (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
228. Id. Another interesting issue is whether a distinction may be drawn
between a typical student and a student athlete. As the Court noted in Vernonia
School District 47J v. Acton, student athletes voluntarily subject themselves to
an environment of communal undress and thus enjoy a lesser expectation of
privacy. 515 U.S. 646, 657 (1995); see supra text accompanying note 210.
Therefore, this may weigh in favor of the reasonableness of a strip search under
this interpretation of the sex requirement.
229. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342.
230. See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. I v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2640
n.1 (2009); T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342 n.9.
231. Redding, 531 F.3d at 1104 (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
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some form of search. Even the most harmless violations of school
policy-chewing gum, wearing hats, passing notes-threaten the
educational environment of the student engaging in prohibited
activity." 232 Judge Hawkins then correctly inferred that the nature
of the infraction was "properly considered in determining whether
[a] search was permissible in scope."233 However, when a strip
search is at issue, at least one of the standards enunciated in
Redding appears to depart from this logic.
In Redding, the Supreme Court held that when a strip search of
a student is at issue, one of two additional elements must be
present before the search will be deemed lawful. The first is a
reasonable suspicion that the object of the search presents a danger
to students.234 This appears to comport with the inference drawn by
Judge Hawkins. If the object sought does present such a danger,
then the nature of the infraction is necessarily severe, and the more
intrusive strip search is reasonable. The second of these two
elements, however, appears to disregard the nature-of-the-
infraction requirement.
The alternative element that will justify a student strip search is
a reasonable suspicion that the student is hiding evidence of an
infraction in his or her underwear. 235 When declaring that a strip
search would be reasonable under such circumstances, the
Supreme Court did not make any mention of the nature of the
infraction at issue. Thus, it appears that the nature-of-the-infraction
element in the TL.O. test-at least with respect to this distinct
element of justification-is no longer relevant to the determination
of whether a student strip search is "excessively intrusive." For
example, under Redding, if a school was to ban the possession of
baseball cards on campus and a school official received
information sufficient to constitute a reasonable suspicion that a
student was hiding one of these cards in his or her underwear, the
official could then strip search the student without consequence.
In Redding, the Supreme Court was correct in holding that the
strip search of a student was categorically distinct from other
similar searches.236 In doing so, it modified the TL. 0. test to
respond to specific concerns with the excessively intrusive nature
of a strip search. The Court's "distinct elements of justification"
are the embodiment of this modification.
232. Id. at 1105.
233. Id. at 1104.
234. Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2643.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 2641.
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B. Distinct Elements ofJustification
In Redding, the Supreme Court held that the assistant principal
did not have a reasonable suspicion to believe either that the pills
sought presented a danger to the school community or that Savana
was hiding these pills underneath her outer clothing. After a
careful analysis of the Court's opinion, however, it is evident that
these standards are not adequate in all situations and can leave a
school official one mistake away from potential liability.
1. A Reasonable Suspicion ofDanger
In its analysis, the Redding Court first explained why the
assistant principal lacked a reasonable suspicion of danger. 7 In
doing so, it looked to three factors: (1) the nature of the threat
presented by the pills sought, (2) the amount of the pills suspected
to be in circulation, and (3) the amount of the pills suspected to be
found on a particular student.238 In Redding, the assistant principal
knew that he was searching for anti-inflammatory medication,
which the Supreme Court deemed to be of limited threat. 239 The
Court then stated that absent a suspicion that large amounts of
these pills were in circulation, or that Savana was in possession of
a large amount of these pills, the assistant principal's actions were
unreasonable.240
The inferences to be drawn from this analysis are many and
varied. First, if the assistant principal was not aware of the nature
of these pills, would his actions have been more or less reasonable?
Earlier in its opinion, the Supreme Court stated, "Teachers are not
pharmacologists trained to identify pills and powders, and an
effective drug ban has to be enforceable fast." ' This statement
appears to support an argument that the strip search of Savana
Redding would have been more reasonable had the pills never been
identified. However, this would create a perverse incentive for
237. Id. at 2642-43.
238. Id. at 2642. Though the remainder of this analysis addresses a search for
illicit pills, a student may be suspected of possessing numerous other dangerous
objects, including firearms and knives. See, e.g., Mark F. Bonner, Students Face
Expulsion; Search Finds Knives, Mace, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), Nov.
18, 2005, at 1 B; School Officials Report Southeast, Baker Students Had Guns,
ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), Feb. 20, 2004, at 16A; Kimberly Vetter, EBR
Student, 13, Pleads Guilty to Bringing Gun onto Campus, ADVOCATE (Baton
Rouge, La.), Oct. 29, 2009, at 3B.
239. Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2642.
240. Id.
241. Id.at2640n.1.
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those school officials who wished to conduct a strip search
regardless of the potential harm presented by the drug. The school
official could merely fail to investigate the nature and threat of the
drug, and therefore avoid the scrutinizing eye of the Court. To
combat this perverse incentive, a court may find that a school
official owes a duty to exercise good faith in identifying the drug.
But, again, if he or she is unable to identify the drug after a good
faith attempt, does that make the subsequent strip search more or
less reasonable? Clearly, the Court's analysis of this factor is
ambiguous and subject to much disagreement.
The second and third factors fare no better. If the object of a
search is of limited threat, the Court implies that a reasonable
suspicion of danger will only exist if a school official suspects
either that a large quantity of the object is in circulation or that a
particular student has a large quantity on his or her person. This
suggests that when determining the reasonableness of a strip
search, there is an inverse relationship between the degree of
danger presented by the object and the quantity of the object. For
example, if a school official suspects that a student is in possession
of a very dangerous drug, the quantity of the drug in circulation or
in the student's possession will be of little importance. However,
as in Redding, if the drug is deemed non-dangerous, only a
suspicion that a large quantity is either in circulation or on the
student will justify the strip search. This factor, too, is sure to be
subject to disparate treatment.
The above analysis is useless, however, unless one can answer
the very important question: At what point is an object dangerous
enough to justify a strip search?242 From the Court's opinion in
242. In attempting to determine the reasonableness of a student strip search,
should school officials and courts consider a substance's legal classification and
the penalty accompanying its possession? Or should they consider other
information? For example, look at Louisiana's treatment of two controlled
dangerous substances-marijuana and OxyContin. Marijuana is classified as a
Schedule I substance because it poses a "high potential for abuse," but has "no
currently accepted medical use." LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:963(A)(l)-(2)
(2001). The penalty for possession may be as severe as twenty years in prison
and a $5,000 fine. Id. § 40:966(E)(3) (Supp. 2010). OxyContin, however, is
classified as a Schedule II substance because it does have a "currently accepted
medical use" but is accompanied by a "high potential for abuse" which "may
lead to severe psychological or physical dependence." Id. § 40:963(B)(1)-(3)
(2001). The maximum penalty for possession is relatively less severe-five
years' imprisonment and a $5,000 fine. Id. § 40:967(C)(2) (Supp. 2010).
Assuming school officials are even aware of these provisions (which is
unlikely), a reasonable official may conclude that marijuana poses a greater
danger than OxyContin, therefore making the strip search of a student for a
small quantity of OxyContin less reasonable than a strip search for a similar
amount of marijuana. In reality, however, marijuana may pose little or no threat
2010] 299
LOUISIANA LA W RE VIEW
Redding, all that is clear is that a small quantity of prescription and
over-the-counter anti-inflammatory pills is not sufficiently
dangerous to warrant a strip search. Students, however, have
been known to abuse an assortment of substances. 244 As Justice
Thomas stated in dissent, the majority opinion places school
officials in an "impossible spot" by requiring them to identify the
dangerous nature of the item sought and its potential harm to the
student body. 245
2. A Reasonable Suspicion ofResort to Underwear
After the Court found that the strip search of Savana Redding
was not supported by a reasonable suspicion of danger, it then
turned to the question of whether the assistant principal had a
reasonable suspicion that Savana was hiding the pills in her
undergarments. Finding that the strip search was not supported
by the requisite suspicion,247 the Court weighed a number of
factors that are relevant to this inquiry.
The first of these factors requires an almost identical inquiry to
that conducted under the previous test: Is the nature of the object
sought dangerous, such that the student could be suspected of
hiding it in his or her underwear? 248 Under this factor, it appears
that an object deemed insufficiently dangerous to justify a strip
search under the previous test may still be dangerous enough to
weigh in favor of the search's reasonableness, but only if it raises
the requisite suspicion-resort to underwear for hiding the object.
After Redding, all that is clear is that a small quantity of
to students. See, e.g., Myths and Facts About Mariuana, DRUG POL'Y
ALLIANCE, http://www.drugpolicy.org/marijuana/factsmyths/ (last visited Feb. 8,
2010). In contrast, the effects of OxyContin are very severe. Abuse of this drug
can cause the user to develop a physical dependence, and this may lead to abuse
of other drugs, especially heroin. Chris Arnold, Teen Abuse of Painkiller
OxyContin on the Rise, NAT'L PUB. RADIo (Dec. 19, 2005), http://www.npr.org/
templates/story/story.php?storyld=5061674. Also, a student who is addicted to
OxyContin may resort to theft to support this expensive habit. Id. Because abuse
of prescription drugs, especially OxyContin, is increasing among teens, id.,
school officials may well believe that even a very small quantity of this drug
poses a danger to a student.
243. Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2642.
244. See supra note 242.
245. Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2651 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
246. Id. at 2642 (majority opinion).
247. Id.
248. Id.
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prescription and over-the-counter anti-inflammatory pills does not
* * *249
raise such a suspicion.
The second factor is whether there is a general practice among
students at a particular school to hide certain contraband in their
underwear.250 The third factor is whether a third party has
suggested that the student to be searched is hiding contraband in
his or her underwear.2 5 1 The probative value of these factors is
obvious. Consider the hypothetical school rule banning the
possession of baseball cards on campus. If in the previous week, a
school official caught three students concealing baseball cards in
their underwear, and then a sufficiently reliable student informed
the school official that a fourth student was concealing a baseball
card in his or her underwear, these two facts would weigh heavily
in favor of a strip search. 252
The fourth factor weighed in Redding, however, is potentially
troublesome. The Court suggested that if the preceding searches of
Savana's backpack and outer clothing had yielded the sought-after
pills, this would have weighed in favor of conducting the strip
search.253 Thus, if a school official has a reasonable suspicion that
a student possesses a large quantity of pills, and he finds one of the
pills in the student's pocket, a subsequent strip search may be
reasonable. But if the school official suspects possession of only
one pill, a fruitful search of the student's pocket should obviate the
need for a more intrusive search. In weighing this factor, courts
and school officials must remember that the legality of a search
depends upon "the reasonableness, under all of the circumstances,
of the search." 254 Therefore, they should still consider all of the
abovementioned factors when determining the propriety of a strip
search.
In summary, requiring a school official to weigh all of these
competing factors and to determine what is or is not reasonable is a
daunting task. The overzealous school official may throw caution
to the wind and pursue a frivolous strip search, thereby subjecting
a child to a very traumatic experience. The more timid school
249. Id.
250. Id.
2 5 1. Id.
252. Because the nature of the infraction is no longer relevant to the
justification of a strip search, see discussion supra Part IV.A.2.d., this
information may be sufficient to constitute a reasonable suspicion that the
student is concealing baseball cards in his or her underwear. Therefore, the strip
search would be reasonable under Redding's second distinct element of
justification.
253. Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2642.
254. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985).
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official, however, may ignore his or her better instincts for fear of
impending litigation. Although with the best of intentions, 255 the
Supreme Court developed a reasonable suspicion standard that is
ambiguous and too complicated to provide clear guidelines for an
official faced with the prospect of strip searching a student. There
is only one solution to problems such as these-a warrant
requirement.
V. ENDING THE SEARCH FOR SALVATION: A WARRANT
REQUIREMENT
Imposing a warrant requirement should be Louisiana's first
step in creating a comprehensive solution to the problems posed by
the strip search of a student. In T.L.O., the Supreme Court found
that requiring a school official to obtain a warrant before searching
a student "would unduly interfere with the maintenance of the
swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in the
schools."256 But as one commentator noted, "However one may
feel about the search of a student's purse, the strip search of a
student cannot be a 'swift' and 'informal' procedure." 257 And as
the Supreme Court recognized, strip searches are in a category all
their own.258 In light of the extremely complicated reasonable
suspicion scheme developed in Redding, a warrant requirement is a
reasonable and reliable solution: It will protect the privacy interests
of students while affording school officials a means to verify the
reasonableness of their actions.
A. How Will It Work?
The United States Constitution provides that "no warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized."25 The Louisiana Constitution of
1974 contains an almost identical provision.260 Both federal and
255. Paul R. Baier, "Classic Traits": Souter/Sotomayor, N.H. BAR Ass'N
(Aug. 14, 2009), http://www.nhbar.org/publications/archives/display-news-
issue.asp?id=5200 (commenting upon Justice Souter's "compassion and
empathy for 13-year-old Savana Redding").
256. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340.
257. Shatz, Donovan & Hong, supra note 32, at 32.
258. Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2641.
259. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added); see also Griffin v.
Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987).
260. LA. CONST. art. I, § 5 ("No warrant shall issue without probable cause
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
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state courts recognize, however, that as applied to a search of a
student's person, the Fourth Amendment requires only a
reasonable suspicion.26 1 And for good reason: As the Supreme
Court noted in T.L. 0., this standard provides to school officials the
flexibility needed to maintain security and order,262 and it "spare[s]
[school officials]" of "the necessity of schooling themselves in the
niceties of probable cause." 263 Therefore, the requisite degree of
suspicion necessary for the issuance of a warrant to strip search a
student should be a reasonable suspicion-no more and no less.
Members of the United States Supreme Court, both past and
present, have disagreed as to whether the United States
Constitution allows a search warrant to issue upon a degree of
suspicion less than probable cause. 264 This disagreement, however,
is irrelevant for the purposes of the warrant requirement proposed
by this Comment. As Justice White noted in T.L.O., "[any state]
may insist on a more demanding standard under its own
[c]onstitution or statutes [than that offered by the Fourth
Amendment]." 265 Furthermore, it has long been recognized that the
Louisiana Constitution of 1974 "[embodies] and often [amplifies]
the protection of certain individual rights afforded by the pre-
existing United States Supreme Court interpretations of the
Fourteenth Amendment and Bill of Rights."266
As one commentator noted, it seems highly illogical "to
preclude the imposition of a warrant requirement on searches and
seizures that are constitutionally reasonable but not supported by
. . . probable cause [as traditionally defined by the courts]."2
Clearly on board with this line of reasoning, Louisiana already
allows for the issuance of a warrant upon a reasonable suspicion
under at least one set of circumstances.268 Therefore, because the
searched, the persons or things to be seized, and the lawful purpose or reason for
the search.").
261. See, e.g., Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009); Lindsey ex rel. Lindsey v.
Caddo Parish Sch. Bd., 954 So. 2d 272 (La. Ct. App. 2007); State v. Barrett, 683
So. 2d 331 (La. Ct. App. 1996).
262. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985).
263. Id. at 343.
264. See Griffin, 483 U.S. 868.
265. Gartner, supra note 53, at 959 (alterations in original) (emphasis added)
(quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 343 n.10 (1985)).
266. State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 755 (La. 1992).
267. Barry Jeffrey Stem, Warrants Without Probable Cause, 59 BROOK. L.
REv. 1385, 1402 (1994).
268. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1563(H)(1) (2008) (granting to the fire
marshal the authority to swear and execute warrants issued by a judge when
there exists a reasonable suspicion that there has been a violation of "any ...
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United States Supreme Court has held that a mere reasonable
suspicion is sufficient to strip search a student,2 69 the Louisiana
Constitution may amplify the protections afforded by its federal
counterpart and mandate the issuance of a warrant on the basis of a
reasonable suspicion. This would be a wise decision in light of the
fact that requiring a warrant to issue before a student may be strip
searched will reap benefits not only for the student, but also for the
school official.
B. When Will It Work?
Redding establishes that the strip search of a student will only
be proper when either of the Supreme Court's distinct elements of
justification is present. But as discussed above, these elements are
ambiguous. Therefore, Louisiana law should further aid school
officials in determining when a student strip search is proper. This
requires the law to (1) specify whether such a search requires an
individualized suspicion and (2) define the term "strip search."
1. The Need For Individualized Suspicion
Louisiana law should permit a student strip search only when a
school official possesses a reasonable and individualized suspicion,
i.e., a belief that the particular student to be searched committed a
27
particular wrong.27o Of the courts that have addressed this issue,
almost all have held that a strip search of a group of students
conducted without an individualized suspicion is unconstitutional.271
Supreme Court precedent supports this conclusion. 272
law for which he is given responsibility for supervision, enforcement, licensure,
or regulation").
269. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009).
270. See, e.g., Konop ex rel. Konop v. Nw. Sch. Dist., 26 F. Supp. 2d 1189,
1201 (D.S.D. 1998).
271. See, e.g., Beard v. Whitmore Lake Sch. Dist., 402 F.3d 598 (6th Cir.
2005) (strip search of an entire class for missing prom money is unreasonable
without individualized suspicion); Thomas ex rel. Thomas v. Roberts, 323 F.3d
950 (11th Cir. 2003) (strip search of 13 fifth-grade students for $26 is
unreasonable without individualized suspicion); Pendleton v. Fassett, No. 08-
227-C, 2009 WL 2849542 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 1, 2009) (strip search conducted
with a mere generalized suspicion that a student present on a bus may possess
marijuana is unreasonable); Foster v. Raspberry, 652 F. Supp. 2d 1342 (M.D.
Ga. 2009) (strip search for a missing iPod is unreasonable without
individualized suspicion); Bell v. Marseilles Elementary Sch., 160 F. Supp. 2d
883, 888 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (commenting that "individualized group suspicion is
insufficient to establish" the reasonableness of a strip search of 30 students for
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When determining the reasonableness of school policies
permitting searches of students without individualized suspicion,
the Supreme Court looks at three factors: (1) the legitimacy of the
student's expectation of privacy, (2) the intrusive nature of the
search, and (3) the interest of the school in conducting the
search.273 Application of these three factors to the student strip
search reveals that such a search will only be reasonable when a
school official possesses an individualized suspicion.
First, the average student possesses a very legitimate
expectation that he or she will not be subjected to a strip search.274
Second, it is nearly impossible to imagine a search more intrusive
than one requirin a student to expose his or her naked body to a
school official.27 As for the third factor, although schools do
indeed have a compelling interest in deterring drug use and
violence, when weighed against the students' interest in not being
strip searched and the excessively intrusive nature of such
searches, it may not be so compelling as to justify a blanket strip
money); Konop, 26 F. Supp. 2d 1189 (strip search of two seventh-grade students
for $200 was unreasonable absent individualized suspicion); Hines ex rel. Oliver
v. McClung, 919 F. Supp. 1206 (N.D. Ind. 1995) (strip search of five seventh-
grade students for $4.50 is unreasonable without individualized suspicion). But
see Oliver, 919 F. Supp. 1206 (implying that a strip search conducted without
individualized suspicion may have been reasonable if for a dangerous object,
rather than money).
272. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
273. Id. at 661. In Vernonia, the Court held that a school policy permitting
the random drug testing of student athletes in the absence of individualized
suspicion was reasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at
664-65. There, the Court found that the students enjoyed a lesser expectation of
privacy because their participation in the athletic program was voluntary and
because the students subjected themselves to an environment of communal
undress. Id. at 657. Also, the search was deemed minimally intrusive because
the male students were allowed to remain fully clothed with their backs to the
school officials monitoring the search, and the female students performed the
test in an enclosed stall concealed from view. Id. at 658.
274. See, e.g., Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2641 ("Savana's subjective expectation
of privacy against [a strip] search is inherent in her account of it as
embarrassing, frightening, and humiliating."); Beard, 402 F.3d at 604 ("Students
of course have a significant privacy interest in their unclothed bodies.");
Pendleton, 2009 WL 2849542, at *4 (finding that a female student "certainly
had a legitimate expectation of privacy in her partially unclothed body").
275. See discussion supra Part II.B.2 and accompanying notes. The cavity
search is one example of a search that is clearly more intrusive. But during oral
argument, the attorney for Safford Unified School District No. I conceded that
school officials should never be permitted to perform a cavity search of a
student. Transcript of Oral Argument at 17, Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (No. 08-
479).
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search of a group of children. The interest in preventing theft is
even less compelling because of the absence of potential physical
harm.276 Clearly, these three factors, especially the intrusive nature
of these searches, weigh heavily in favor of a rule prohibiting the
strip search of a student absent individualized suspicion.
Given the Supreme Court's guidance and that of other courts
that have dealt with this issue, Louisiana law should not leave
school officials in the dark as to whether the blanket strip search of
a group of students is a reasonable measure; instead, it should
affirmatively declare that it is not. Such a rule will further protect
the interests of innocent students and will ensure that school
officials do not find themselves on the losing side of a court's
decision.
2. Strip Searches Are "Categorically Distinct"
The Supreme Court stated that the search of Savana Redding
required either of the abovementioned "distinct elements of
justification" because this type of search is "categorically
distinct." 277 The Court then failed, however, to provide a concrete
statement regarding exactly what types of searches fall within this
category. The language in the opinion suggests two alternative
interpretations-one broad and one narrow.
Under the broad interpretation, the Constitution requires at
least one of the distinct elements of justification whenever a
student is subjected to a search "going beyond . . . outer clothing
and belongings."278 Il other words, Redding is applicable to any
search requiring a student to reveal what is hidden below his or her
outer clothing. A narrow interpretation, however, is supported by a
statement near the end of the Court's decision, which says that the
distinct elements of justification are required "before a search can
reasonably make the quantum leap from outer clothes and
backpacks to exposure of intimate parts."279 Therefore, narrowly
interpreted, the Constitution may require application of the
Redding standards only when a student, if male, is required to
276. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 382 n.25 (1985) (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (commenting that a strip search
"must only be to prevent imminent, and serious harm"); Beard, 402 F.3d at 605
(citing Oliver, 919 F. Supp. at 1218) ("IA] search undertaken to find money
serves a less weighty governmental interest than a search undertaken for items
that pose a threat to the health or safety of students, such as drugs or weapons.").
277. Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2641.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 2643 (emphasis added).
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expose his pelvic area, and, if female, is required to display her
breasts or pelvic area or both.
Of the two alternatives, Louisiana should adopt the broad
interpretation. Its application is simple: If a school official's search
will venture beneath a student's outer clothing, the official must
have at least one of Redding's distinct elements of justification. 280
Also, this interpretation is more closely aligned with the definition
of a strip search as a "visual inspection of an individual's body"
that includes, but is not limited to, parts "usually hidden by
undergarments."28' In contrast, adoption of the narrow standard
would be difficult to apply and would require the reasonableness of
a strip search to hinge upon arbitrary factors, such as the revealing
nature of the particular undergarments worn by a student on a
particular day. By adopting the broad definition, Louisiana law
will give school officials clear notice as to when a particular search
is governed by the Redding standards, making it less likely that
these embarrassing and potentially traumatic searches will be
conducted without reason.
C What Are Its Benefits?
As courts have noted on multiple occasions, "[n]o right is held
more sacred, or is more carefully guarded . . . than the right of
every individual to the possession and control of his own person,
free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and
unquestionable authority of law." 282 School officials and courts
should give this statement special consideration in light of the
severe psychological harm inflicted upon children subjected to
strip searches. Injecting the decision of a judge, a neutral third
party, between the school official and the student will result in a
more reliable decision as to whether the underlying circumstances
justify the search2 84-a decision unaffected by the pressures placed
upon school officials to keep children safe, no matter the cost.2 85
280. In Lindsey ex rel. Lindsey v. Caddo Parish School Board, 954 So. 2d
272 (La. Ct. App. 2007), a school official required a 15-year-old student to fold
down his waist band in an attempt to find $50. Id. at 273-74. Under the
proposed broad interpretation, this search would be subject to Redding
standards.
281. Shatz, Donovan & Hong, supra note 32, at 1.
282. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (quoting Union Pac. Ry. Co. v.
Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)); accord State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 757
(La. 1992).
283. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
284. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913-14 (1984).
285. See discussion supra Part II.A.
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Thus, the obvious benefit to students, as well as society as a whole,
is that fewer children will be subjected to frivolous and potentially
traumatic strip searches while attending school.
As previously illustrated, the Redding standards are too
ambiguous to put school officials on notice as to when a strip
search will be reasonable. Thus, these officials will also benefit
from a warrant requirement because it places "the crucial task of
making delicate judgments and inferences from facts and
circumstances in the hands of a detached and neutral
magistrate." 286  If school officials attempt to make these
determinations on their own, they will find themselves exposed to
potential liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.287 And in light of the
Supreme Court's recent pronouncement in Redding, a lower court
may find that the law is now clearly established, therefore denying
these officials the defense of qualified immunity. 288 The warrant
requirement can cure this problem.
Besides the increased likelihood of a more reliable decision,
allowing a school official to apply for a warrant may entitle the
official to qualified immunity even when the search is held
unreasonable after the fact. When a school official conducts a strip
search pursuant to a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate, the
official will almost always possess a good faith belief in the
constitutionality of the search and therefore be entitled to qualified
immunity.289 This does not mean, however, that school officials
should apply for warrants when circumstances do not support this
286. State v. Edwards, 787 So. 2d 981, 987 (La. 2001). Not only are judges
better trained and more experienced in making determinations such as this one,
but they are also absolutely immune from suit. See, e.g., Knapper v. Connick,
681 So. 2d 944, 946 (La. 1996) ("Absolute immunity attaches to all acts within a
judge's jurisdiction, even if those acts can be shown to have been performed
with malice, in order to insure that all judges will be free to fulfill their
responsibilities without the threat of civil prosecution by disgruntled litigants.").
287. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
288. See discussion supra Part II.E.
289. As the Supreme Court recognized in Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.
635 (1987), a public official is entitled to qualified immunity if "a reasonable
[official] could have believed [his or her conduct] to be lawful, in light of clearly
established law and the information [the official actually] possessed." Id. at 641.
A school official possessing a valid warrant issued by an officer of the judiciary
will have such a belief. Thus, only when the circumstances are such that a
reasonably well-trained school official would be aware of the blatant invalidity
of the search will the official conducting the search be held liable for damages.
Cf Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 346 n.9 (1986) (explaining that generally a
police officer will not be held liable when a judge mistakenly issues a warrant);
Leon, 468 U.S. at 922-23 (explaining that a warrant issued by a magistrate will
usually suffice to show that the police officer was in good faith when conducting
a search).
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action. Only when a school official has an objectively reasonable
belief that the contents of the affidavit are sufficient to establish a
reasonable suspicion will that official be entitled to immunity for
his or her good faith belief.290 Because the Supreme Court has
recognized that school officials are ill-equipped to make
complicated legal determinations,29' the necessary standard of
reasonableness will be fairly low. Still, when the circumstances
clearly do not support a strip search, yet an overzealous school
official applies for a warrant anyway, a judicial officer's mistaken
authorization of the search will not shield the official from
liability. 292
As for obtaining a warrant, although this will result in a delay293before a strip search may proceed, such delay will be minimal.
And as previously stated, "the strip search of a student cannot be a
'swift' and 'informal' procedure." 294 Louisiana recognizes a
number of ways in which school officials can complete this task
quickly and efficiently. In particular, the Louisiana Code of
Criminal Procedure allows a warrant to issue "by telephone, radio,
or such other electronic method of communication deemed
appropriate by the judge." 295 Additionally, a recent act passed by
the Louisiana Legislature permits individuals to submit warrant
applications via e-mail.296 Moreover, completing the application
for the warrant should not be unduly burdensome. The warrant
would issue upon a reasonable suspicion, which requires that only
those facts sufficient to show "a moderate chance of finding
evidence of wrongdoing" be put forth.297
290. Malley, 475 U.S. at 345.
291. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 344 (1985) (stating that a
reasonable suspicion standard will "spare teachers and school administrators the
necessity of schooling themselves in the niceties of probable cause"); Vemonia
Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664 (1995) (stating that "spotting and
bringing to account drug abuse" is "a task for which [school officials] are ill
prepared, and which is not readily compatible with their vocation").
292. Malley, 475 U.S. at 345.
293. Because of this delay, school officials may need to detain the student
until the warrant is obtained. Courts have recognized that detaining a student for
a brief period is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Stockton v.
City of Freeport, Tex., 37 F. App'x 712 (5th Cir. 2002); Milligan v. City of
Slidell, 226 F.3d 652 (5th Cir. 2000); State in Interest of Feazell, 360 So. 2d 907
(La. Ct. App. 1978).
294. Shatz, Donovan & Hong, supra note 32, at 32.
295. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 162.1(B) (2003).
296. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2603.1 (Supp. 2010) ("An application for any
warrant . . . shall not be denied legal effect or enforceability solely because it is
in electronic form. Any such application ... shall have the full effect of law.").
297. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. I v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2639
(2009).
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However, in cases where a delay in conducting a strip search
will result in "immediate physical danger to students, teachers, or
the official conducting the search," 298 a school official should be
able to proceed with the search without a warrant under an
"emergency exception."299 For example, if the student is suspected
of possessing a dangerous weapon, school officials may act
immediately to ensure that the student does not harm others. 0 0 In
all other situations, the school official should obtain a warrant
before proceeding with a strip search.
In short, requiring a warrant to be issued before a school
official may strip search a student will spare both the official and
the school board from the burdens of costly litigation and, more
importantly, will spare the student from the traumatic effects
associated with such an experience. Although this requirement will
somewhat delay the search, such delay will be negligible, and its
short-term costs will be outweighed by its long-term benefits.
Furthermore, this delay will force the school official to
momentarily reflect on the facts in an objective manner; many
times, this may be all that is needed to prevent the strip search of a
child. In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Redding, a
warrant requirement is a reasonable solution that will further the
interests of both school officials and their students.
D. Test Suite
Applying the proposed warrant requirement to a fact pattern
similar to the one in Redding will illustrate its benefits. Say that a
school official has a reasonable and individualized suspicion that a
student named Seth is hiding pills somewhere on his person. If the
searches of Seth's possessions and outer clothing reveal no pills,
the school official may reasonably infer that Seth is hiding the pills
beneath his outer clothing. Under the proposed solution, the school
298. Gartner, supra note 53, at 978.
299. See State v. Ludwig, 423 So. 2d 1073, 1075-76 (La. 1982). Although in
Ludwig, the Louisiana Supreme Court dealt with the search of a person's
residence, the court's reasoning is applicable in this case. There, the court
defined the emergency exception as allowing "police officers [to] enter a
dwelling without a warrant to render emergency assistance to a person they
reasonably believe to be in distress and in need of such assistance." Id. at 1075.
In the school setting, a school official ought to be able to proceed with a strip
search if he or she believes that failure to do so will result in harm to either the
student, the student body at large, or the faculty and staff.
300. In this example, although the school official would not enjoy the
benefits of a warrant, he or she will almost assuredly possess a reasonable
suspicion of danger. Therefore, the strip search would be reasonable.
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official will have to obtain a warrant before proceeding any
further.
In Redding, school officials detained Savana for over two hours
before conducting the strip search. 30 1 Given the same amount of
time, the school official in this hypothetical could easily call or e-
mail a local judge and provide him or her with the following
information: a student informed school officials that a group of
students would consume drugs; this student turned in a pill and
implicated Tom as the source; Tom implicated Seth; and Tom and
Seth were known friends and had been involved in a prior incident
involving alcohol at a school dance. With this information, the
judge must determine whether there exists either a reasonable
suspicion of danger or a reasonable suspicion of resort to
underwear for hiding the pills. 302 If the judge finds the information
insufficient, he or she can refuse to issue the warrant. The school
official would then take appropriate alternative measures, such as
sending Seth back to class or calling his parents to pick him up
from school. If, however, the judge finds the information
sufficient, he or she can issue the warrant. Not only will the school
official be shielded from potential liability, but the public can rest
assured that the strip search of Seth was the result of the judgment
of an independent third party, rather than an overzealous school
official.
VI. CONCLUSION
To say that school officials are between a rock and a hard place
is a gross understatement. Bubble gum and untucked shirts are not
the only problems between a young child and a high school
diploma: Assault, drug use, vandalism, theft, poor academic
performance, gangs, and teenage regnancy are the obstacles
standing in the way of progress. For the school officials
responsible for educating our children, caring for them on a daily
basis, and keeping them safe from harm, the decision to resort to a
strip search is a difficult one, and common sense will probably
restrict such a measure to only those circumstances when it is
absolutely necessary. Even then, however, school officials and
school boards risk financial liability.
In Redding, the United States Supreme Court held the strip
search of a 13-year-old girl unconstitutional. Though the Court
came to the correct conclusion, in doing so it provided a standard
301. Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2652 n.4 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
302. Id. at 2643 (majority opinion).
303. See LANE, supra note 19, at 6-12 (1995).
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that may prove to be unworkable. For this reason, Louisiana must
craft a standard of its own. The strip search of a child should only
occur when there is an individualized suspicion and, absent a risk
of imminent harm, only with judicial approval. Such a policy will
remedy Louisiana's silence and provide clear guidance where
before there was only ambiguity. School officials will find safe
harbor from liability, and students will neither be unreasonably
traumatized nor allowed to bring other injury upon themselves or
society.
Undoubtedly, the policies and practices of school
administration can sometimes consist of a complicated balancing
act. But, as has often been quoted, "The credit belongs to the man
who is actually in the arena." 304 Now is not the time for Louisiana
to sit idly by while waiting for the next student strip search to
occur. The Louisiana Legislature should amend the statute
governing the search of a student's person,30 5 and it should do so
soon.
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